EASA NPA 2025-12: What Actually Changes in Continuing Airworthiness?

Published: 24 April 2026 · Approx. 10-minute read

EASA NPA 2025-12 is titled Regular Update of the Continuing Airworthiness Regulation. The title sounds administrative, but several proposed amendments would have a direct practical effect on how operators, CAMOs and maintenance organisations control continuing airworthiness in daily operation.^[1]

The proposal would amend Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 and the associated Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM). EASA states that the proposed material is intended to improve clarity and consistency, address outstanding items from legacy rulemaking tasks, align with ICAO SARPs, support digitalisation, delete obsolete provisions and simplify selected requirements.^[1]

The affected areas include Part-M, Part-ML, Part-CAMO, Part-CAO, Part-145, Part-66, Part-147 and Part-T. This article is not a complete overview of NPA 2025-12. It focuses on selected changes that, in our view, have clear practical impact on current continuing airworthiness and maintenance control systems.

1. CAMO and AMO responsibilities: not new responsibilities, but a clearer audit trail

Proposed GM1 M.A.301 explains the roles in continuing airworthiness tasks. EASA clarifies that the tasks listed in M.A.301 imply aircraft configuration control, and that the person or organisation responsible under M.A.201 remains responsible for continuing airworthiness. The release of maintenance remains the responsibility of the maintenance organisation or person who performed the maintenance. ^[2]

What actually changes?

This is not a new split of responsibility. In practice, CAMO already controls aircraft configuration and continuing airworthiness, while the AMO performs and releases maintenance.

The important proposed change is that EASA explains the interface more explicitly, including the difference between maintenance release and aircraft airworthiness status. EASA also clarifies that a Certificate of Release to Service confirms that the specific maintenance work has been completed in accordance with the applicable requirements, but it does not necessarily mean that the entire aircraft is airworthy.^[2]

Actual effect on current operation

This gives authorities and compliance monitoring teams a stronger basis to challenge weak CAMO–AMO interfaces. The CAMO cannot rely only on the statement that the AMO released the work. The CAMO must still be able to demonstrate that the aircraft configuration is known, the required maintenance was ordered, the performed maintenance was reviewed, the aircraft status was updated, and the maintenance contract terms were satisfied.

Critical operational point

The real exposure is not the legal responsibility split. The real exposure is the evidence chain.

The CAMO–AMO interface must show:

• what maintenance was required;
• what was ordered;
• what configuration standard was applicable;
• what was performed;
• what was released;
• what feedback was returned to CAMO;
• how the aircraft status was updated.

If the records cannot connect these steps, the interface is weak even if the responsibilities are correctly written in the CAME and MOE.

2. Aircraft Technical Log System: out-of-phase maintenance and cabin defects become more visible

Proposed M.A.306(a)(3) clarifies that the Aircraft Technical Log System shall indicate when the next scheduled maintenance is due, including out-of-phase maintenance. EASA also proposes that, if accepted by the competent authority, certain information may be kept outside the technical log, provided that equivalent controls ensure that no flight takes place without the required maintenance being performed and released, and that flight crew have access to the information when required.^[3]

Proposed AMC M.A.306(a) also clarifies that cabin or galley defects and malfunctions affecting the safe operation of the aircraft or the safety of its occupants should be made known to the flight crew and recorded in Section 3 of the technical log, even where the operator uses another tool such as a cabin log. ^[4]

What actually changes?

The change is not simply that the next scheduled maintenance must be visible. Many operators already control this through an ATL, electronic tech log, MCC, AMOS, TRAX, OASES or other planning systems.

The practical change is more precise:

• out-of-phase maintenance is clearly brought into the scheduled-maintenance visibility logic;
• the technical log or approved alternative system must prevent dispatch with overdue or unreleased maintenance;
• cabin and galley defects affecting safe operation or occupant safety must not remain isolated in a separate cabin log;
• the current CRS location and defect / maintenance continuity are clarified.

Actual effect on current operation

This amendment targets transparent defect and maintenance-status control. Operators using separate cabin logbooks, cabin apps or informal cabin-defect tracking must ensure that safety-relevant cabin defects are integrated into the aircraft technical log workflow. The cabin log cannot become a separate defect-management tool that hides safety-relevant defects from the commander, maintenance and CAMO.

Critical operational point

Cabin defects cannot be treated as a separate defect-management system when they affect safe operation or occupant safety.

The operator needs clear criteria for when a cabin defect remains in a cabin log and when it must enter Section 3 of the technical log. The weak point will be cabin defects incorrectly treated as cosmetic although they affect safety, such as seats, restraint systems, emergency equipment, placards, galley/lavatory defects, unsafe stowage and evacuation-related items.

3. Fuel-system and fuel-tank tasks: stronger Critical Maintenance Task screening

AMC1 M.A.402(h) is proposed to include maintenance tasks on fuel systems and tanks among tasks that should primarily be reviewed to assess their impact on safety. EASA links this proposal to safety recommendations SR UNKG-2021-018 and SR UNKG-2021-019, following an event where excessive biocide treatment of aircraft tanks resulted in an engine malfunction.^[5]

GM M.A.402(h) is also proposed to add safety publications from aviation authorities, such as Safety Information Bulletins, as one of the data sources that may be used to identify Critical Maintenance Tasks. ^[6]

What actually changes?

Fuel-system and fuel-tank maintenance tasks are moved into a more explicit safety-impact review area. This does not mean that every fuel-system or fuel-tank task automatically becomes a Critical Maintenance Task. It means such tasks must be reviewed for safety impact and, where applicable, controlled as Critical Maintenance Tasks.

The addition of authority safety publications means that the organisation’s Critical Maintenance Task identification process must actively consider relevant authority safety publications. If a competent authority issues mandatory instructions through an applicable legal instrument, those instructions must be followed. However, a Safety Information Bulletin by itself should not be described as automatically mandatory unless the applicable authority framework makes it so.

Actual effect on current operation

Maintenance planning and engineering need to review whether fuel-system and fuel-tank tasks have been correctly assessed for criticality. The weak point is where fuel-system work is treated as routine because it is common. The NPA makes the safety impact more visible, especially for tasks where incorrect accomplishment can affect fuel supply, propulsion, contamination control, tank safety or CDCCL-related controls.

Critical operational point

The organisation needs to show the decision trail:

• which fuel-system and fuel-tank tasks were reviewed;
• which were classified as Critical Maintenance Tasks;
• what independent inspection or error-capture control was selected;
• whether authority safety publications were reviewed;
• how the conclusion was recorded.

If the only answer is that the organisation followed the job card, the Critical Maintenance Task assessment may be too weak.

4. Repetitive defects: CAMO defect control must connect to SMS and root-cause logic

Proposed GM1 M.A.403 introduces detailed guidance on the management of repetitive defects. It defines a repetitive defect as an aircraft defect or system malfunction that reoccurs on the same aircraft because the underlying root cause has not been effectively eliminated. EASA specifically refers to cases where troubleshooting is not performed, where a defect is temporarily cleared through a system reset, where only an operational check is performed, where fault codes are not retrieved, or where troubleshooting is incomplete or ineffective.^[7]

What actually changes?

The important change is that repetitive-defect management becomes more than defect counting. The CAMO is expected to establish and apply procedures that enable timely identification, control and coordination of repetitive-defect rectification by the maintenance organisation. EASA also expects hazards and risks associated with repetitive defects to be documented within the CAMO Safety Management System. ^[7]

Actual effect on current operation

The CAMO needs a process that integrates repetitive-defect management with the management system, compliance monitoring and SMS.

This should include:

• defined repetitive-defect criteria;
• aircraft-level monitoring;
• review of previous maintenance actions;
• use of BITE/fault data;
• assessment of safety impact;
• root-cause and corrective-action logic;
• escalation when rectification is ineffective;
• monitoring of contracted maintenance performance.

Critical operational point

Repeated defects closed with “reset carried out”, “ops check satisfactory” or “no fault found” become much harder to defend if there is no technical reasoning trail and no SMS-based assessment where safety impact exists.

The practical question is no longer only whether the defect was deferred or cleared. The stronger question is: did the organisation recognise the repeat pattern, assess the safety risk, identify the root cause and control the corrective action?

5. Reliability programme alone is not enough: CAMO must show more immediate aircraft-level awareness

GM1 M.A.403 states that fleet-level evaluation of repetitive defects through the AMP reliability programme remains relevant, but reliance on the reliability programme alone is insufficient to mitigate the potential flight-safety impact for each managed aircraft. CAMOs are expected to identify and monitor repetitive defects regularly so that they can be resolved without waiting for the next reliability report.^[8]

What actually changes?

This is a clear practical shift. EASA separates fleet reliability monitoring from aircraft-level repetitive-defect control. A reliability programme may identify a trend at fleet level, but it may be too slow for an individual aircraft that is already showing repeated symptoms.

Actual effect on current operation

CAMO must demonstrate more immediate defect control and awareness. This means the organisation should have a routine aircraft-level defect review process, not only a monthly reliability meeting. The SMS should also be able to capture and assess repetitive-defect hazards, especially where operational pressure, repeated resets, lack of spares, lack of qualified personnel or deferred troubleshooting may reduce the safety margin.

Critical operational point

If repetitive defects are identified only during periodic reliability review, the system may be too slow. The CAMO should be able to show when the repeated defect was first recognised, who reviewed it, whether SMS/risk assessment was triggered, what corrective action was required, and how the effectiveness of rectification was monitored.

6. Safety-critical defects need a different workflow

GM1 M.A.403 supports a risk-based approach to repetitive defects. It specifically notes that systems such as flight controls, landing gear and propulsion systems have a great influence on flight safety and may require additional or more stringent troubleshooting and corrective actions. It also recognises operational pressure and lack of qualified personnel as hazards that may adversely affect repetitive defect management. ^[9]

Actual effect on current operation

Organisations should not treat all repetitive defects with the same urgency. A repeated defect on a cabin comfort item and a repeated defect on a flight control, landing gear or propulsion-related system do not carry the same safety weight. The procedure should allow escalation, deeper troubleshooting, additional engineering support, possible aircraft removal from service, or maintenance check flight consideration when justified.

Critical operational point

The defect workflow must be risk-based. If a safety-critical system becomes repetitive, the aircraft-level response must be more immediate and more conservative than for a low-impact defect.

7. Troubleshooting and recording practices: the “reset and test” grey zone is reduced

GM1 M.A.403 gives practical guidance on troubleshooting and recording. It states that the absence of a fault on the ground does not necessarily mean that fault data cannot be retrieved from onboard maintenance systems. It also states that maintenance records should include precise references to maintenance or troubleshooting tasks performed, steps accomplished, test results and measured values where applicable.^[10]

The same guidance states that aircraft system resets should be used with caution and in accordance with maintenance data. Whenever a system reset is used to address a fault, the action is to be recorded in the aircraft technical log. Performing only operational checks or repeating identical BITE tests without applying the full troubleshooting procedure cannot be considered sufficient for a repetitive defect.^[10]

What actually changes?

The proposal reduces the grey zone around aircraft dispatch after “reset and test — fault cleared”. A reset may still be an acceptable action when permitted by maintenance data and appropriate to the case. However, for repetitive defects, EASA now gives a clearer basis to challenge repeated resets, repeated BITE-only checks and repeated “no fault found” conclusions that do not advance troubleshooting.

Actual effect on current operation

CAMO must demonstrate sufficient and timely monitoring of defect troubleshooting. The maintenance record should show:

• what defect was reported;
• what system configuration and flight phase were involved;
• whether previous occurrences were reviewed;
• whether fault codes or BITE data were retrieved;
• what troubleshooting steps were performed;
• what test results or measured values were obtained;
• why the selected rectification was considered effective.

Critical operational point

The record must show the logic of troubleshooting, not only the final release result. For repetitive defects, each maintenance action should move the investigation forward. If the same defect repeatedly returns after resets or operational checks, the organisation should escalate the troubleshooting approach instead of restarting the same process.

8. ETOPS becomes EDTO and moves into the Part-CAMO system

NPA 2025-12 adopts the ICAO terminology Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO). The proposed Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO states that EDTO was introduced through Amendment 36 to ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Section 4.7 and replaced ETOPS. It also notes that the term ETOPS may still appear in some documentation, for example manufacturer documentation, and may be considered equivalent to EDTO. ^[11]

In practical terms, the ETOPS wording is being deleted or replaced where the continuing airworthiness material is moved from Appendix 8 to AMC 20-6B into the new Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO. This makes the continuing airworthiness side of EDTO more clearly embedded in the CAMO system.^[12]

What actually changes?

This is more than terminology. The term ETOPS is replaced by EDTO to align with ICAO wording, but the stronger operational change is that the continuing airworthiness control of EDTO is moved into the Part-CAMO environment.

Actual effect on current operation

CAMO must demonstrate complete control of EDTO from contractual-interface level to task-execution level.

This means EDTO must be visible in:

• CAME procedures;
• AMP;
• reliability programme;
• EDTO significant system control;
• maintenance planning;
• task cards and work packages;
• pre-departure checks;
• parts and configuration control;
• maintenance contract interfaces;
• staff training and qualification.

Critical operational point

EDTO cannot sit mainly in Operations documentation. If Operations holds the approval but CAMO cannot trace the EDTO requirements into the AMP, task cards, stores process, Part-145 contract, staff competence and reliability review, the approval is not fully controlled from a continuing airworthiness perspective.

9. CAME must address operational requirements with continuing airworthiness impact

NPA 2025-12 proposes to address operational requirements with continuing airworthiness impact. The proposal links these requirements to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and Regulation (EU) 2015/640, and introduces EDTO-related continuing airworthiness considerations in the Part-CAMO environment.^[13]

Actual effect on current operation

The CAME should not describe only generic CAMO processes. It should explain how the CAMO controls operational requirements that affect continuing airworthiness. This may include EDTO, special approvals, CS-26-related items, MEL-related continuing airworthiness controls, and other operational requirements that affect maintenance, configuration or reliability.

Critical operational point

This is where many organisations may find a gap between the Operations manual and the CAME. The practical question is: where is the bridge between the operational approval and the continuing airworthiness controls needed to support that approval?

10. EDTO significant systems must be identified and controlled

Proposed Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO states that the CAMO should define a list of EDTO significant systems for each fleet of a given aircraft type operated under EDTO. The list should be based on TC holder recommendations and may be adapted according to CAMO experience and internal procedure. The CAME and the contracted AMO MOE should define and control identical, similar and redundant EDTO significant systems. ^[14]

Actual effect on current operation

The CAMO needs a controlled list of EDTO significant systems by fleet. This affects planning, maintenance error control, reliability monitoring, defect follow-up and how the Part-145 organisation assigns tasks and controls work on redundant or similar systems.

Critical operational point

This is not just a list for the manual. If the list exists in the CAME but is not visible in task cards, work packages, maintenance planning or reliability review, the control is weak.

11. EDTO tasks must be visible in task cards or work packages

Proposed Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO expects EDTO-related tasks to be identified in task cards, related instructions or separate EDTO work packages. If EDTO-related tasks are not identified in the task-card package, the organisation may need to treat the wider package as requiring EDTO-qualified personnel, depending on the applicable procedure and approval basis.^[15]

Actual effect on current operation

Maintenance planning must identify EDTO tasks before the work is performed. This affects work package preparation, task-card marking, staff assignment, release planning, independent inspections or verification steps, and coordination with contracted Part-145 organisations.

Critical operational point

If the planning system does not clearly mark EDTO tasks, the organisation may lose control of who is allowed to perform and release EDTO-sensitive maintenance.

12. EDTO parts and configuration control become more explicit

Proposed Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO requires the CAMO to consider EDTO configuration standards, including the CMP document where applicable, and to control parts used on aircraft operated under EDTO. The proposed guidance addresses ordering, receiving, storing, identifying and using EDTO parts, including the prevention of unapproved and bogus parts and the need to verify that replacement parts are approved for EDTO use.^[16]

Actual effect on current operation

Purchasing, stores, receiving inspection, planning and Part-145 maintenance must know when a part has EDTO relevance. The correct part number alone may not be sufficient if EDTO configuration restrictions apply.

Critical operational point

This may affect pooled, borrowed, exchange or AOG-sourced parts. EDTO eligibility must be confirmed before installation, not discovered later during records review.

13. Maintenance contracts and interfaces need to describe EDTO control

EASA proposes that EDTO-related activities performed by contracted maintenance organisations and subcontractors should be properly defined and applied. The proposal also links EDTO to maintenance contracts and interface procedures between the CAMO and the Part-145 AMO.^[17]

Actual effect on current operation

Generic maintenance contracts may not be enough. The CAMO–Part-145 interface should define who identifies EDTO tasks, who assigns EDTO-qualified personnel, who controls EDTO parts, who performs and records EDTO pre-departure checks, who reports EDTO events and how reliability and defect information is exchanged.

Critical operational point

Many contracts say that maintenance will be performed in accordance with approved data, but do not clearly define special-approval controls. That may not be sufficient for EDTO-sensitive operations.

14. Digital CRS records and EASA Form 1 signatures require eIDAS-level control

Proposed AMC M.A.801(e) states that an aircraft certificate of release to service may be issued in physical or digital format. Where it is issued in digital format, an acceptable means of ensuring identification of the person signing the certificate and data integrity is to use an electronic signature meeting at least the requirements for advanced electronic signatures under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, known as eIDAS. ^[18]

The AMC to Appendix II to Part-M is also proposed to support the use of electronic signature and electronic exchange of EASA Form 1. EASA proposes to replace the older reference to Directive 1999/93/EC with the eIDAS framework and to associate data integrity and signatory identification with advanced electronic signatures.^[19]

What actually changes?

The change is not simply that digital records are accepted. Digital records were already used in many organisations. The proposed change is that the acceptable digital-signature standard is made more explicit. The signature must support signatory identification and data integrity at least at the level of an advanced electronic signature under eIDAS.

Actual effect on current operation

A scanned signature, pasted signature image, or digitally handwritten signature image is not sufficient by itself unless it is part of an electronic-signature process that meets the eIDAS-level requirements. Under eIDAS, an advanced electronic signature must be uniquely linked to the signatory, capable of identifying the signatory, created using signature-creation data under the signatory’s sole control, and linked to the signed data so that later changes are detectable.

Critical operational point

A PDF with a visible signature is not automatically a controlled digital CRS or electronic EASA Form 1.

The organisation must be able to prove:

• who signed;
• how the signatory was authenticated;
• that the signature was under the signatory’s control;
• that the signed data was protected from undetected alteration;
• that the record is retained and retrievable;
• that the system audit trail supports the release process.

If the signature is only an image placed on a document, the digital process is weak.

15. Part-66 aircraft type-rating references become more dynamic

NPA 2025-12 proposes replacing the aircraft type-rating list included in Appendix I to AMC to Part-66 with a web-based version on the EASA website. The proposed material also emphasises that a broad type rating does not automatically prove competence on every model, variant or configuration within that rating. ^[1]

Actual effect on current operation

Part-145 and Part-147 organisations need stronger control of current type-rating references. For Part-145, this also affects authorisation. A licence endorsement alone may not prove practical competence on every model or variant within the rating.

Critical operational point

The real issue is model and variant competence. The organisation must verify that certifying staff are competent for the actual aircraft configuration, not only that the licence contains a broad type rating.

16. Part-145 compliance personnel may perform maintenance under controlled conditions

Proposed AMC1 145.A.30(c);(ca) clarifies that the compliance monitoring function should remain independent from maintenance functions. However, for the purpose of maintaining recency of experience or gaining relevant expertise, compliance monitoring personnel may carry out maintenance activities, provided their regular function does not include actions related to the maintenance activity in which they are involved.

During such activity, they should be treated as maintenance personnel under the coordination of the responsible maintenance function and subject to applicable procedures. The process, controls and mitigating measures should be described in the organisation’s procedures where applicable.^[20]

What actually changes?

This introduces a useful level of flexibility. It allows compliance monitoring personnel to maintain licence recency, gain practical exposure, obtain, maintain or amend an AML, or support their regular compliance duties through controlled maintenance involvement.

Actual effect on current operation

The benefit is practical competence. Compliance personnel can remain technically current and connected to real maintenance activity. The risk is independence.

If compliance monitoring personnel perform maintenance and later audit the same task, work package, shift, process, personnel or maintenance event, the independence of the compliance monitoring function may be compromised.

Critical operational point

The MOE should define the boundary before the activity happens. It should specify:

• who authorises compliance personnel to perform maintenance;
• under which maintenance function they are controlled;
• how the activity is recorded;
• how recency or expertise benefit is justified;
• how conflict of interest is prevented;
• how the person is excluded from auditing the same activity later.

This is practical flexibility, but only if the independence control is real.

17. Part-145 support staff age limit is proposed for deletion

NPA 2025-12 proposes deletion of the existing 145.A.35 provision stating that the minimum age for certifying staff and support staff is 21 years. The change sits within a wider set of amendments to 145.A.35 addressing certifying staff and support staff competence, recency, recurrent training and authorisation controls. ^[21]

Actual effect on current operation

If adopted, the removal of the explicit 21-year minimum age would place even greater emphasis on demonstrated competence, licence or qualification status, task experience, recurrent training, authorisation scope and the organisation’s assessment before authorisation.

Critical operational point

This is flexibility, not relaxation of control. Age should not be the main barrier; competence and authorisation discipline should be.

18. Part-145 NDT scope is clarified

NPA 2025-12 proposes clarification that the D1 Non-Destructive Testing rating is necessary when NDT is carried out as a particular task for another organisation or third parties. It also clarifies that an A-, B- or C-rated organisation may carry out NDT on products it maintains without a D1 rating, provided the MOE contains appropriate NDT procedures and the activity remains within the approved scope.^[22]

Actual effect on current operation

Part-145 organisations performing NDT should check whether their approval rating, MOE scope and procedures match the work actually performed, especially on-wing NDT, off-site NDT and NDT performed for third parties.

Critical operational point

The risk is not the NDT itself. The risk is performing NDT outside a clearly approved and procedurally controlled scope.

Overall assessment

NPA 2025-12 is stronger than a simple clean-up exercise. It targets areas where the principle is often already known, but the daily evidence chain becomes weak: aircraft technical log visibility, cabin defect escalation, CAMO–AMO interface records, repetitive-defect monitoring, SMS integration, troubleshooting evidence, Critical Maintenance Task assessment, EDTO control, digital-signature integrity, staff competence and contract interfaces.

The proposal moves the system toward one central expectation: continuing airworthiness control must be demonstrable in daily operation, not only described in the exposition.

Practical review checklist

• Review CAMO / AMO interface records from work order to CRS and aircraft status update.
• Check whether the aircraft technical log system clearly shows next scheduled maintenance due, including out-of-phase maintenance.
• Confirm that cabin and galley safety defects are communicated to flight crew and recorded in Section 3.
• Review Critical Maintenance Task procedures for fuel-system and fuel-tank maintenance.
• Include authority safety publications among sources used for identifying Critical Maintenance Tasks.
• Define clear criteria for identifying repetitive defects on each aircraft and linking them to SMS/risk assessment where applicable.
• Ensure repeated resets, BITE tests and “no fault found” closures trigger structured troubleshooting review.
• Introduce stronger escalation for repetitive defects affecting safety-critical systems.
• Review CAME procedures for operational requirements with continuing airworthiness impact.
• Review EDTO significant system lists, EDTO task identification, pre-departure checks and parts control.
• Review CAMO–Part-145 contracts for EDTO-specific responsibilities and reporting flows.
• Verify digital CRS and electronic EASA Form 1 signature controls against eIDAS expectations.
• Review Part-66 model and variant competence controls.
• Review MOE controls where compliance monitoring personnel may perform maintenance.
• Review support staff authorisation criteria if the explicit age requirement is removed.
• Review NDT rating, MOE scope and procedural control.

Conclusion

The practical message is clear: organisations should not wait for final adoption to understand the impact. Even as a proposal, NPA 2025-12 shows where EASA expects stronger evidence of real control.

The key question for operators, CAMOs and maintenance organisations is simple: can the organisation prove, aircraft by aircraft, that repeated defects are detected early, SMS/risk assessment is triggered when needed, safety-critical tasks are controlled, EDTO requirements are embedded in maintenance planning, parts are eligible, digital signatures are trustworthy, and contracted organisations are working to the same controlled system?

Global Aero Services A&C can support operators, CAMOs, lessors and MRO stakeholders with independent review of continuing airworthiness procedures, technical records, CAMO–Part-145 interfaces and practical audit-readiness actions.

References

1. EASA — NPA 2025-12, Regular Update of the Continuing Airworthiness Regulation
2. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — GM1 M.A.301, roles in continuing airworthiness tasks
3. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — M.A.306, aircraft technical log system and next scheduled maintenance due
4. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — AMC M.A.306(a), cabin and galley defects in Section 3 of the technical log
5. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — AMC1 M.A.402(h), fuel-system and fuel-tank tasks as Critical Maintenance Task candidates
6. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — GM M.A.402(h), authority safety publications as data sources for Critical Maintenance Task identification
7. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — GM1 M.A.403, repetitive defect definition and examples
8. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — GM1 M.A.403, reliability programme alone not sufficient for aircraft-level repetitive defect control
9. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — GM1 M.A.403, risk-based approach and safety-critical systems
10. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — GM1 M.A.403, troubleshooting, resets, BITE data and recording practices
11. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — EDTO introduced by ICAO Annex 6 Part I and Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO
12. EASA NPA 2025-12 (C) — AMC 20-6B proposed references to Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO
13. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — operational requirements with continuing airworthiness impact
14. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO, EDTO significant systems
15. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO, EDTO task identification
16. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO, EDTO parts and configuration control
17. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — Appendix VI to AMC to Part-CAMO, EDTO contracts and interfaces
18. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — AMC M.A.801(e), digital CRS and eIDAS-level electronic signature
19. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — AMC to Appendix II to Part-M, electronic signature and electronic exchange of EASA Form 1
20. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — AMC1 145.A.30(c);(ca), compliance monitoring personnel performing maintenance under conditions
21. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — 145.A.35, proposed deletion of minimum age of 21 for certifying staff and support staff
22. EASA NPA 2025-12 (B) — Part-145 NDT scope clarification